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In March 2019, reeling from news of two fatal crashes, countries around
the world grounded the Boeing 737 MAX. The United States, however, was a
notable holdout. In refusing to act, the United States maintained that relevant
authorities “had not provided data” that would warrant action.1 In other
words, until there is evidence of error, there is no reason to ground Boeing
planes. Other countries, meanwhile, were of the contrary view that until there
is evidence of no error, the prudent course is to ground Boeing planes. Do
these differing responses reflect divergent views of safety? Is the U.S. response
more attributable to the dominance of free market ideology in our country?
Equally likely, we may be seeing a fundamental difference in views toward
governmental obligation. The United States may be the outlier, embracing
the traditional view that individual rights, including constitutional rights, are
“negative rights” to be held against governmental infringement rather than
positive rights to be enforced by affirmative government action. It is a view
for a limited and restricted government and a preference for political and civil
rights, rather than social and economic rights.
Yet widening income gaps are growing globally along with the call for
greater economic and social rights. And so, what is the future for economic
and social rights and their ability to secure fundamental resources necessary
for development and well-being? Challenges to social and economic rights
have been prolific. One argument is that “positive” rights place costs on
the state that “negative rights” do not. Critics point out that while negative
rights require withdrawal of government action, positive rights require
costly government enforcement. Furthermore, judicial enforcement of social
and economic rights is said to be antidemocratic in subverting majoritarian
policy decision by judicial fiat. A third challenge points out that assertions
of social and economic rights in lieu of more radical distributive equality
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tend to benefit“middle-income” groups rather than the poorest and most
marginalized, and ignore underlying structural conditions. So, how could we
meet these critiques and set the groundwork for future development of social
and economic rights, with the promise of bringing along even such reluctant
governments as the United States?
Katharine Young’s timely edited volume, The Future of Economic and Social
Rights, sets us on the right path. In this “thoroughly researched and highly
illuminating collection of articles” (as quoted from Amartya Sen’s introduction
to the volume), Young’s authors, as a group, have composed one of the
more comprehensive volumes on human rights in recent years. The Future of
Economic and Social Rights presents both theoretical as well as practical solutions,
documents past as well as future challenges, and, in broadening the lens to
social and economic rights, links them to trade and development conditions
and to the importance of democracy itself.
The Future of Economic and Social Rights adds to the rights debate in a number
of ways. Predictably, this collection begins with several chapters examining
the social and economic rights discourse and the demands of social justice. As
such, these chapters trace the experiences of countries enshrining economic
and social rights with constitutional protection in such diverse locales as
South Africa, India, and Canada. The conclusion is that about two-thirds
of the 200 constitutional texts today have enshrined social and economic
rights, with civil law traditions and former communist countries taking the
lead. More interestingly, the volume proceeds to also focus on the question of
the justiciability of social and economic rights and the use of adjudication to
enforce these rights.
Certainly, Young’s volume is not the first to examine the judicialization of
social and economic rights (“SER”) or how rights discourse is filtered and
reframed to local cultural context. For example, in Social and Economic Rights
in Theory and Practice: Critical Inquiries, Helena Alviar Garcia, Karl Klare, and
Lucy Williams gathered together a group of scholars to explore how SER
are enshrined and enforced in constitutions in the “Global South.” Similarly,
Sally Engle Merry, in her comparative study Human Rights and Gender Violence:
Translating International Law into Local Justice, traced how human rights discourse is
translated and adapted into the local context in China, India, and the United
States. But Young’s collection picks up where these others left off.
Among the most interesting sections in this volume is the one specifically
addressing the long-standing challenge to the judicialization of social and
economic rights as antidemocratic. This challenge parallels the challenge to
expansive judicial powers generally, but has greater force in the economic
and social rights context. The critique maintains that social and economic
rights invite a greater form of judicial review that can circumvent the elected
branches on issues of unresolvable disagreement. These critics also point
out that judicial remedies in the social and economic rights context often
require affirmative government obligations that are resource-intensive and

766

\ Education
Journal of Legal

polycentric. Judicial remedies in the face of legislative inaction then are said
to be problematic as costly, antimajoritarian and undemocratic.
Young’s authors turn to the process of adjudication itself to argue that the
use of the courts may be “mutually constitutive of democracy” itself. They
address the oft-cited argument against economic and social rights litigation
by noting evidence of new and democratically responsive juridical trends, and
new modes of review that incorporate and encourage greater participation
than even the legislative process. Rather than judicial fiat, social and economic
rights litigation is serving as a platform for a deliberative process that is the
basis of democratic decision-making.
To start, for example, in “Courts and Economic and Social Rights/Courts
as Economic and Social Rights,” Judith Resnik points out that rather than
simply a medium of enforcement of social and economic rights, access to courts
itself is a social and economic right necessary to the preservation of democracy
itself. She writes, “[i]f courts make true on their obligations to accord dignified
and equal treatment to all disputants and do so in public, courts may be one
venue in which to garner popular support for the continuation of democratic
sovereignties, struggling as ‘aspiring states’ to fulfill commitments to equality”
(Resnik, p. 261-62). Furthermore, as documented by Rodriguez-Garavito
on India (Garavito, pp. 233-58) and Roberto Gargarella on Latin America
(Gargarella, p. 212-33), the adjudicatory process itself has resulted in designing
remedies that institute public hearings, meaningful negotiations, and other
forms of deliberation that are more participatory than otherwise have been
possible.
Indeed, these chapters document how some courts in the name of social
and economic rights scrutinize the participatory processes of decision-making
and the rationality of budgetary decision-making to ensure that the needs of
the most vulnerable have been heard and that less restrictive alternatives have
been considered. In other words, in the context of economic and social rights
litigation, the trend has been to enforce democratic processes and to ensure
proper participation and consideration of all the facts in the decision-making.
As such, enforceable economic and social rights have the potential to be not
only “mutually constitutive” of democracy, but emblematic of democracy
itself.
Looking beyond courts, Young’s authors also examine how new mechanisms
of accountability have developed, either as human rights institutions or
specialized administrative commissions or legislative committees providing
oversight alongside or apart from “courts.” These “accountability” mechanisms
can be sometimes found at the subnational local level, even if the national supra
state (including in the United States) is unsupportive of social and economic
rights. We are reminded, then, of the need to disaggregate the nation state and
to look for pockets of resistance and success wherever they may be found.
In looking to the future, Young’s authors urge conceiving of social and
economic rights as more than a “line item” goal with zero-sum gains. Rather,
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they embrace a more holistic view of these rights as interconnected, with
“acceptable” baselines, and with “universal” rather than “targeted” measures.
The argument is that the “line item” method and a “zero-sum” game approach
has meant a replication of the inequality that exists generally, with the middle
class benefiting from its greater ability to tackle single-minded goals. And so,
Young’s authors argue for a fuller sense of how each right is realized in balance
with other guarantees, how these rights are often indivisible and independent
from each other, and how they require both affirmative government action as
well as negative restraint. But here is where the authors differ. While Philip
Alston engages with his proposal for a Universal Basic Income (Alston,
p. 377), a series of chapters takes a comparative look to see how countries
utilize different benchmarks, with adequacy sometimes more successful than
exposing “equality” concerns.
Finally, the volume brings back the importance of markets and the state,
recognition of the pressure upon the state in its regulation of markets, and
meaningful appreciation for how rights-based review cannot neglect study
of how domestic revenues are mobilized, by trade tariffs, taxation, and other
international sources of support (under Olivier De Schutter’s extensive
analysis). Concerns about sustainability and other limits on growth when
grappling with the earth’s changing climate are also brought to the fore.
Jeremy Perelman explores the intersection of rights with practices of economic
globalization and development with his terminology of a “rights-ification” of
development. (Perelman, pp. 434-70).
In sum, this is a rich volume, and one that will serve as an enduring
handbook for years to come.

